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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 8, 1993, Amanda Demich gave a taped statement to the Lorain, Ohio 
police department that her boyfriend, Joseph Dowd, had beaten her.1  A police 
detective took photographs of Demich’s injuries, which included bruises on her face 
and thighs.2  Demich later testified before a grand jury that Dowd caused the injuries 
shown in the photographs by hitting her.3  On April 13, 1993, Dowd was indicted on 
                                                                
1State v. Dowd, No. 93CA005638, 1994 WL 18645, at *1 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1994). 
2Id. 
3Id. 
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counts of felonious assault, kidnapping, and assault.4  Three weeks later, though, 
Demich recanted her previous statements to the police and grand jury by stating that 
Dowd was not the person who assaulted her.5  Demich’s recantation essentially left 
the prosecution without a case against Dowd. 
The situation in Dowd illustrates a common challenge that prosecutors face in 
domestic violence cases.  In a conventional criminal case the prosecution can expect 
to rely on the cooperation and participation of the victim to obtain a conviction.6  In a 
domestic violence case, however, the prosecution will often encounter victims who 
refuse to testify, recant previous statements, or whose credibility is attacked with 
questions on why they remained in a battering relationship.7  In an attempt to explain 
this behavior by the victims of domestic violence, prosecutors in many jurisdictions 
now rely on expert testimony relating to the battered woman syndrome.8  In Ohio, 
however, a prosecutor in a domestic violence case like Dowd cannot introduce any 
expert testimony to explain the behavior of the victim. 
Since the mid-1980’s, expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome has 
been widely used by female murder defendants who claim that they have killed their 
batterers in self-defense.9  The Ohio Supreme Court first permitted such use of the 
syndrome in 1990.10  More recently, courts in several jurisdictions have accepted 
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome introduced by prosecutors in 
domestic violence cases.11  Despite this growing trend, Ohio courts have prohibited 
it.12   
                                                                
4Id. 
5Id. 
6Audrey Rogers, Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: 
From Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 67, 68 (1998). 
7Id. 
8Id.; see also David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the 
Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 96 (1997). 
9Rogers, supra note 6, at 68; see also State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990); State v. 
Daws, 662 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
10Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 974-75. 
11Rogers, supra note 6, at 68-69; see Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 
1991); People v. Morgan, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Gadlin, 92 Cal. 
Rptr.2d 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Lafferty, 9 P.3d 1132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); State 
v. Borelli, 629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993); State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194 (Haw. 1996); State v. 
Cababag, 850 P.2d 716 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993); Carnahan v. State 81 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1997); State v. Giffin, 564 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1997); Commonwealth v. Goetzendanner, 
679 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); People v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1995); 
State v. Searles, 680 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1996); State v. Frost, 577 A.2d 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1990); People v. Hryckewicz, 634 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); State v. 
Ciskie, 751 P.2d. 1165 (Wash. 1988); Sate v. Bednarz, 507 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); 
see also Isaacs v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1036 (Ind. 1995) (allowing expert testimony on the 
syndrome in prosecution of husband for murder to show that couple did not have friendly 
relationship).  
12See Dowd, No. 93CA005638, 1994 WL 18645; see also State v. Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 
665 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).  
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It is only a matter of time before the Ohio courts will again face a situation where 
a prosecutor wants to admit expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to 
explain the seemingly abnormal behavior of a victim of domestic violence.  The 
growing modern trend towards allowance of the testimony,13 and the arguments of 
several commentators supporting allowance,14 will no doubt have an impact on how 
the court reacts to this issue in the future.  Before any change can take place, 
however, prosecutors in Ohio must develop an appropriate approach for introducing 
testimony on the syndrome under the Rules of Evidence. 
This note contends that Ohio should join the modern trend and allow expert 
testimony on the battered woman syndrome in a limited form in domestic violence 
prosecutions.  Part II of this note explores the syndrome and its origins.  Part III 
provides background on the evidentiary uses of the syndrome in Ohio.  It discusses 
the emergence of the battered woman syndrome in Ohio courts, and then examines 
the unsuccessful initial attempts by prosecutors in Ohio to use expert testimony on 
the syndrome. 
Part IV looks at how several jurisdictions outside of Ohio have addressed this 
issue.  Part V presents the argument that prosecutors in Ohio should be allowed to 
introduce battered woman evidence in domestic violence cases.  To provide a basis 
for this argument, it begins by setting forth the applicable Ohio Rules of Evidence.  
Next, it examines each of the arguments currently cited in Ohio against prosecutorial 
use of battered woman evidence, and attempts to rebut each one in turn.  Finally, it 
proposes a framework for the prosecutorial introduction of testimony on the 
syndrome that will enhance the likelihood of overturning the precedent in Ohio.  Part 
VI provides concluding remarks. 
II.  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
A.  The Problem of Domestic Violence 
According to the American Institute on Domestic Violence, between three and 
four million women are battered each year in the United States.15  Each year nearly 
1,500 of these women are killed by their batterer.16  Battering is the single most 
common cause of injury to American women, more common than car accidents, 
muggings, and rape combined.17   
                                                                
13See note 11, supra; see also Part IV, infra. 
14See Rogers, supra note 6; Diana Patton, “He Never Hit Me” – The Need for Expert 
Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases, 1994 ARIZONA ATTORNEY 10; James Martin Truss, 
The Subjection of Women … Still: Unfulfilled Promises of Protection for Women Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149 (1995). 
15American Institute on Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Statistics; Crime 
Statistics; Workplace Violence Statistics, available at http://www.aidv-usa.com/Statistics.htm. 
(last visited January 26, 2004). 
16Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of Battered Woman 
Syndrome By and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 789, 792 (1996). 
17A.M. Keith, Domestic Violence and the Court System, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 105, 106 
(1991) (reprinting of speech by Minnesota Chief Justice Keith at Hamline University, 1991).    
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Scholars trace the roots of domestic violence against women back for thousands 
of years.  The violent punishment of wives is known to have been allowed, approved 
and expected in many cultures from the time of ancient Egypt until as recently as the 
early American common law.18  The common law “rule of thumb” permitted men to 
beat their wives “with a rod or stick no larger than a man’s thumb or small enough to 
pass through a wedding band.”19  Commentators suggest that the rule was viewed as 
a “natural and necessary right of control” that was incident to the man’s role as head 
of the family.20
The problem surrounding domestic violence has been described as “a conspiracy 
of silence.”21  Sociologist Del Martin offered the following vivid description of this 
silence:  “We can picture a very thick door locked shut.  On the inner side is a 
woman trying hard not to cry out for help.  On the other side are those who could and 
should be helping but instead are going about their business as if she weren’t 
there.”22  Dr. Lenore Walker, with her book The Battered Woman, took one of the 
largest steps towards opening this proverbial “thick door.” 
B.  The Battered Woman Syndrome 
Dr. Walker is widely recognized as the first person to identify the battered 
woman syndrome.23  From 1978 through June 1981, Dr. Walker conducted a study of 
over 400-battered women to learn about the effects of domestic violence.24  Her 
research led her to define the syndrome as “a cluster of psychological symptoms” 
that women develop from living in a violent relationship.25   
                                                                
18See Patton, supra note 14, at 10. 
19Truss, supra note 14, at 1157; see also State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60 (1874). 
20Truss, supra note 14, at 1157.  Truss also states that the rule was justified because the 
husband was often civilly or criminally liable for the actions of his wife.   
21Keith, supra note 17, at 106. 
22Id. 
23Rogers, supra note 6, at 71. 
24LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, 2d ed., ix (2000).  Dr. 
Walker originally published the first edition of the BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME in 1984.  
The first edition was, “written to present an integration of the final analysis from [her] 
research project into the body of literature specializing in understanding spouse abuse that was 
available at the time.”  The second edition attempts, “to analyze the original study results in 
light of the new clinical and empirical research and determine if the original conclusions still 
hold true today.”  Dr. Walker ultimately decided that the original conclusions still hold true. 
Id. at ix–x. 
25Id. at ix.  Dr. Walker stated that, “[t]he goals of the research project were to identify key 
psychological and sociological factors that compose the battered woman syndrome, test 
specific theories about battered woman, and collect comprehensive data on battered woman.”  
Id.  Dr. Walker tested the “learned helplessness theory” and the “cycle theory of battering.”  
The first test relied on the hypothesis that “learned helplessness” is responsible for the 
apparent emotional, cognitive and behavioral deficits observed in the battered woman that 
negatively influence her from leaving a relationship after the battering occurs.  The second test 
relies on the hypothesis that further victimization occurs by the nature of the “cycle of 
violence.”  Id. 
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The battering relationship itself is often described as cyclical in nature, with three 
distinct phases: tension building, confrontation, and contrition.26  During the “tension 
building” phase, the woman is generally compliant, often feeling as though she 
deserves the abuse.27  Once the tension reaches a boiling point, the batterer will erupt 
uncontrollably, committing a violent act.28  Next, in an abrupt about-face, the abuser 
will exhibit seemingly intense love and affection towards his victim.29  The 
victimized women are then led to believe that the violence was an isolated incident 
and that it will not continue.30  This cycle of violence may leave the victim with 
feelings of learned helplessness, low self-esteem, depression, minimization 
techniques, self-isolation, and passivity.31  It is this collection of resulting symptoms 
that has come to be known as the “battered woman syndrome.”   
The psychological reactions exhibited by victims of domestic violence can prove 
to be troublesome for a prosecutor in a domestic violence case.  This is because the 
prosecutor’s case is normally built around the testimony of the victim.  A battering 
victim’s behavior can often appear baffling and even frustrating to the average 
juror.32  Many victims, as a result of the contrition of their abuser, remain in abusive 
relationships or refuse to pursue legal action against the batterer.33  The defense will 
attack the legitimacy of an alleged victim’s claim because of her delay in leaving the 
relationship and seeking police intervention.  Additionally, victims frequently recant 
previously made statements to the police or prosecutors that implicate their 
significant other as an abuser.34   
Historically, if the victim recanted her story or was not cooperative with the 
investigation, the prosecutor would be forced to drop the case.  The advent of “no 
drop” policies within many prosecutors’ offices, however, has forced prosecutors to 
face these issues within the context of litigation.35  In an attempt to explain the 
sometimes seemingly abnormal behavior by the victims, prosecutors have begun to 
look towards expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.   
III.  OHIO COURTS AND THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
A.  Emergence of Battered Woman Evidence in Ohio 
Ohio courts have approached the battered woman syndrome very cautiously.  The 
Ohio Supreme Court initially addressed the battered woman syndrome in 1981, in 
                                                                
26Rogers, supra note 6, at 71; see also Truss, supra note 14, at 1170-1172.  
27Truss, supra note 14, at 1170. 
28Id. at 1170-71. 
29Id. at 1171. 
30Id. 
31Rogers, supra note 6, at 71-72. 
32Id. at 72. 
33See id; see also Truss, supra note 14, at 1171-72.  
34Rogers, supra note 6, at 72. 
35See id. at 73.  A “no-drop” policy essentially requires a prosecutor, once informed of a 
domestic violence situation, to pursue prosecution regardless of the victim’s cooperation.  Id. 
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State v. Thomas.36  In Thomas, the defendant, Kathy Thomas, was indicted and found 
guilty of murdering Reuben Daniels, her common law husband.37   Thomas and 
Daniels had lived together in a “stormy relationship” for about three years before the 
killing,38 during which Thomas was repeatedly beaten.39  Thomas admitted to the 
murder, but claimed self-defense because she feared for her life.40
At trial, Thomas’ counsel attempted to call an expert witness to testify on the 
battered woman syndrome to aid the jury in weighing the evidence concerning 
Thomas’ subjective state of mind at the time of the killing.41  The trial court refused 
to admit the testimony and Thomas was convicted.42  In upholding the trial court’s 
decision, the Ohio Supreme Court cited four reasons for finding the proffered expert 
testimony inadmissible.43  First, the court stated that the testimony was, “irrelevant 
and immaterial to the issue of whether defendant acted in self-defense at the time of 
the shooting.”44  Second, “the subject of the expert testimony is within the 
understanding of the jury.”45  Third, “the battered [woman] syndrome is not 
sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to 
                                                                
36423 N.E.2d 137 (Ohio 1981). 
37Id. at 138. 
38Id. 
39Id. 
40Id.  It was undisputed that Thomas shot Daniels once in the forehead and once in the left 
arm.  Thomas gave three different versions of the killing to the police.  In the first version, the 
couple had an argument over cooking and as a result Daniels became very angry and slapped 
Thomas and pushed her down.  Thomas stated that after she got up she walked to the chair 
where Daniels was sitting and shot him.  Id.  In the second version, Thomas stated the couple 
had an argument, which led to Daniels pushing her down on the couch.  This time, however, 
further arguments ensued and as Daniels was rising from the chair to attack Thomas, she 
reached for the gun on the couch and shot him.  Id.  In the third story, Daniels, upon pushing 
Thomas to the couch, turned and walked away from her when she picked up the gun.  Thomas 
followed Daniels and stated “I’ve had enough,” and then shot Daniels.  Id. 
41Id. 
42Id.  The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial because of the 
trial court’s refusal to allow the expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome and the 
peculiar state of mind which might prompt the shooting of the “battering husband.”  Id.   
43Id. at 140.  
44Id.  The court stated that in a trial where the evidence raises an issue of self-defense, “the 
only admissible evidence pertaining to that defense is evidence which establishes that 
defendant had a bona-fide belief she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, 
and that the only means of escape from such danger was through the use of deadly force.”  Id. 
at 139. 
45Id. at 140.  The court believed that the jury was able to understand and determine 
whether self-defense had been proven without expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome.  Id. at 139.  The court stated that, “the jury will base its decision upon the material 
and relevant evidence concerning the participants’ words and actions before, at, and following 
the murder, including defendant’s explanation of the surrounding circumstances.”  Id. 
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warrant testimony under the guise of expertise.”46  Finally, the court believed that the 
prejudicial impact of the testimony outweighed its probative value.47
Thomas survived several challenges over the next decade and remained good law 
until 1990.48  In State v. Koss, the Ohio Supreme Court was again faced with the 
same issue as in Thomas.49  Defendant, Brenda Koss, after several years of brutal 
beatings and threats to her life, killed her husband.50  Koss claimed self-defense and 
at trial she sought to introduce expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in 
support of her claim.51  Following Thomas, the trial court refused the testimony.52  
Koss was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and was sentenced to eight to 
twenty-five years in prison.53   
Justice Alice Robie Resnick wrote the majority opinion for the court in Koss.54  
Justice Resnick began by discussing Thomas’s emphasis on the syndrome’s lack of 
scientific basis.55  She contended that in the nine years since the holding in Thomas, 
                                                                
46Id. at 140.  The court stated that the expert testimony was “distinctly related to some 
science, profession or occupation so as to be beyond the ken of the average lay person.”  Id. at 
139.  Additionally, there was no general acceptance of the expert’s particular methodology.  
Id. 
47 Id. at 140.  The court stated that it believed “the expert testimony offered here would 
tend to stereotype defendant, causing the jury to become prejudiced.”  Id.  It feared that the 
jury would decide the case based on the typical facts of the battered woman and not the actual 
facts.  Id.  
48See, e.g., State v. Branham, No. C-850269, 1986 WL 6810, (Ohio App. 1 Dist. 1986); 
Tourlakis v. Morris, 738 F.Supp. 1128 (S.D. Ohio 1990);  State v. Tourlakis, No. 52035, 1987 
WL 10040 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1987).  
49551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990). 
50Id. at 971.   Koss was questioned at the police department after her husband’s body was 
found in the Kosses’ house.  She told the police that she came home around midnight and went 
into the bedroom and began changing.  She stated that her husband then “hauled off” and hit 
her.  Id.  The next thing that she remembered was hearing a “noise or something” and seeing a 
holster on the ground, but she denied shooting her husband.  Id.  She stated that she did not 
remember seeing the gun until she was in the car fleeing the scene.  Id.  At trial her story 
changed significantly.  She stated that when she came home she saw the gun on a bedside 
table and it frightened her.  Id.  She testified that, before her husband hit her, she “must have 
picked up the gun” out of fear.  Id.  After her husband hit her she heard a noise, which 
sounded like gurgling blood.  Id.  She stated that, “I purposely did not kill Michael Koss,” and 
“[I]f I killed him, it was an accident.”  Id.   
51Id.  Koss sought to introduce experts to testify that there are two components of the 
battered woman syndrome.  The first component is establishing that the woman is, in fact, a 
battered woman.  Second, is that “at the time of the incident, all the prior battering incidents 
appear in a flashback to the woman, thus triggering an immediate fear of death and causing 
her to respond almost instinctively in self-defense.”  Id. at 972. 
52Id. 
53Id. 
54Id. 
55Id. 
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several books and articles were written on the battered woman syndrome.56  She 
cited to decisions in several jurisdictions that had already approved the use of expert 
testimony on the battered woman syndrome.57  Then, following a general discussion 
of expert testimony rules in Ohio, Justice Resnick discussed in general terms the 
scope of admissible expert testimony.  She stated that “[e]xpert testimony in Ohio is 
admissible if it will assist the trier of fact in search of the truth.”58  Justice Resnick 
also cited Ohio Evidence Rule 702’s requirement that the expert testimony must be 
“specialized” and “assist the trier of fact to understand evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue.”59  She wrote that “[e]xpert testimony regarding the battered woman 
syndrome can be admitted to help the jury not only to understand the battered 
woman syndrome but also to determine whether the defendant had reasonable 
grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent danger when considering the 
issue of self-defense.”60  Thus, Thomas was explicitly overruled to the extent that 
expert testimony relative to the battered woman syndrome could now be admitted to 
support the affirmative defense of self-defense.61
For the purposes of this Note, however, Justice Resnick’s dicta regarding the 
syndrome itself are more important than the specific holding in Koss.62  Justice 
Resnick maintained: 
Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would help dispel the 
ordinary lay person’s perception that a woman in a battering relationship 
is free to leave at any time.  The expert evidence would counter any 
“common sense” conclusions by the jury that if the beatings were really 
that bad the woman would have left her husband much earlier.  Popular 
misconceptions about battered women would be put to rest, including the 
beliefs that the women are masochistic and enjoy the beatings and that 
they intentionally provoke their husbands into fits of rage.63
She acknowledged that it might seem as if the expert is giving testimony on a subject 
of common knowledge, the reasonableness of a person’s fear of imminent serious 
danger.64  Regarding the purpose of the testimony, though, Justice Resnick 
contended: 
                                                                
56Id.  
57Id.; see People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Hodges, 716 
P.2d 563 (Kan. 1986); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); Hawthorne v. State, 408 
So.2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984). 
58Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973. 
59Id. 
60Id. 
61Id. at 974–75.  
62See Part V.B. infra, for a discussion on the importance of Justice Resnick’s dicta in 
Koss. 
63Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973. 
64Id. at 974. 
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It is aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of the jury 
may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors’ logic, drawn from their 
own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where 
expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior 
conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge.65
This reasoning applies with equal force to the prosecutorial use of expert testimony 
on the battered woman syndrome in Ohio. 
Moreover, the court’s recognition of these matters in Koss is now also part of 
Ohio statutory law.  Six months before Koss came before the Ohio Supreme Court on 
December 5 1989, Representative Joseph Koziura introduced a bill on the House 
floor of the Ohio legislature.  House Bill 484 was introduced as the General 
Assembly’s official recognition that the battered woman syndrome was a matter of 
commonly accepted scientific knowledge and that the subject matter is not within the 
general understanding of average person.66  The legislation was also designed to 
permit evidence on the syndrome to prove self-defense.67  House Bill 484, now 
codified as Ohio Revised Code § 2901.06, was eventually signed into law on August 
6, 1990, approximately five months after the decision in Koss was handed down.68
Subsection (A) of § 2901.06 declares that the General Assembly recognizes both 
of the following in regard to the battered woman syndrome: 
(1) That the syndrome currently is a matter of commonly accepted 
scientific knowledge; 
(2) That the subject matter and details of the syndrome are not within the 
general understanding or experience of a person who is a member of the 
general populace and are not within the field of common knowledge.69
Subsection (B) continues by stating:  
If a person is charged with an offense involving the use of force against 
another and the person, as a defense to the offense charged, raises the 
affirmative defense of self-defense, the person may introduce expert 
testimony of the ‘battered woman syndrome’ and expert testimony that 
the person suffered from that syndrome as evidence to establish the 
requisite belief of an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm that 
is necessary, as an element of the affirmative defense, to justify the 
person’s use of the force in question.  The introduction of any expert 
                                                                
65Id. 
66H.R. 118-HB484, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Ohio 1990), available at 
http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/oh_ban_118:HB484.lsc.   
67Id. 
68Id.  The house initially passed the bill by a vote of 83 – 9, on March 1, 1990.  Id.  The 
senate then passed the bill by a vote of 31 – 1 on June 14, 1990.  Id.  The house passed the 
final amended version on July 20, 1990 and the bill became effective on November 5, 1990.  
Id.  The importance of the timing of the introduction of this bill will be fully developed in Part 
V.B. of this note.   
69OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (A) (1)-(2) (West 2003). 
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testimony under this division shall be in accordance with the Ohio Rules 
of Evidence.70
As will be seen in the next section, however, Ohio courts have cited to subsection 
(B) of § 2901.06 as a limitation on the use of expert testimony on the battered 
woman syndrome.  Part V.B. explains why the court’s interpretation is wrong.   
B.  Initial Prosecutorial Attempts to Use the Battered Woman Syndrome in Ohio 
In the years following Koss, two Ohio Courts of Appeals have heard and rejected 
prosecutorial attempts to introduce testimony on the syndrome in domestic violence 
cases.  The Ohio Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, however, seemingly 
leaving the door open for future prosecutorial attempts.  
Just one year after the initial admission of expert testimony concerning the 
battered woman syndrome in Koss, a prosecutor attempted to extend the use of 
testimony on the syndrome by introducing it in a domestic violence case.71  State v. 
Pargeon involved the prosecution of Randy Pargeon for the alleged battering of his 
wife.72  At trial, the prosecution called Diane Roberts, director of the local battered 
woman’s shelter, as an expert witness to testify on the syndrome.73  The trial court 
permitted the testimony and Pargeon was convicted on two counts of domestic 
violence.74  Pargeon appealed his conviction to the Fifth District Court of Appeals.75
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
decision.76  The court began its analysis by citing two Ohio Rules of Evidence as 
prohibiting expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in domestic violence 
cases.  First, the court believed that the testimony was prohibited under Ohio 
Evidence Rule 403(A) because the probative value of the testimony was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.77  Second, it stated that Ohio Evidence 
Rule 404(B) prohibited the testimony because evidence that Pargeon’s wife is a 
battered woman “really serves as evidence of the prior bad acts of [Pargeon] from 
which the inference may be drawn that [Pargeon] has the propensity to beat his wife 
and that he beat her on this particular occasion.”78
The court, however, cited the holding in Koss and the language of O.R.C.  
§ 2901.06 as a “more compelling” reason for not allowing expert testimony on the 
battered woman syndrome in domestic violence cases.79  The court reasoned that the 
holding in Koss limited the admissibility of expert testimony on the battered woman 
                                                                
70OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (B) (West 2003).   
71Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 665. 
72Id. 
73Id. at 666. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77Id.  See Part V.A., infra, for the language of Ohio Evidence Rule 403(A). 
78Id.; see Part V.A., infra for the language of Ohio Evidence Rule 404(B). 
79Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 666. 
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syndrome to cases where a woman charged with the murder of her husband uses it to 
establish the “imminent danger of death or great bodily harm” element of the 
affirmative defense of self-defense.80  Additionally, the court understood O.R.C.  
§ 2901.06(B) to limit the use of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to 
cases where a woman raises the affirmative defense of self-defense.  Therefore, the 
trial court’s decision was reversed and the case was remanded for further 
proceedings.81
Likewise, State v. Dowd involved the prosecution of Joseph Dowd for domestic 
violence against Amanda Demich.82  As mentioned in the Introduction, the problem 
arose when Demich, who had previously told police and a grand jury that Dowd had 
beaten her, recanted her story at Dowd’s bond hearing.83  At trial, the prosecution 
attempted to call a licensed psychiatrist as an expert witness.84  The psychiatrist was 
to testify on the characteristics of a battering relationship and how a woman suffering 
from the battered woman syndrome will often recant or retract earlier statements 
implicating her significant other for abuse.85  The trial court cited Pargeon and found 
that the state could not offer expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in a 
domestic violence prosecution.86
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding “no reason to deviate from the Fifth 
District’s analysis in Pargeon.”87  The court was especially concerned that the expert 
testimony “could create the potentially prejudicial inference that Dowd has the 
propensity to beat Demich and that he did so on this particular occasion.”88   
                                                                
80Id.  The court cited the syllabus in Koss, which states,  
[a]dmission of expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome does not 
establish a new defense or justification.  It is to assist the trier of fact to determine 
whether the defendant acted out of an honest belief that she is in imminent danger of 
death or great bodily harm and that the use of such force was her only means of 
escape.   
Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 971. 
81Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d. at 668.  The court also addressed the issue of whether Diane 
Roberts, as Director of the Licking County Battered Woman’s Shelter, qualified as an expert 
on the battered woman syndrome.  Id. at 666.  The court held that, “[t]he competency of a 
witness to testify as an expert (and thus give opinion testimony) is directed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court and is to be determined by the court as a matter of law.”  Id. at 667.  
The jury must determine whether they believe the witness’ testimony is credible and decide 
what weight to give the opinion testimony.  Id.  The court stated that this rule “applies to any 
opinion testimony, not just expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome.”  Id. 
82Dowd, No. 93CA005638, 1994 WL 18645 at *1. 
83Id. 
84Id. 
85Id.  
86Id. 
87Id. at *2. 
88Id.  The court acknowledged that, based on photographs of her injuries, Demich was 
assaulted, but held that the issue for the jury to determine was whether Dowd committed the 
assault.  Id.  Excluding evidence on the syndrome, however, essentially shut the door on the 
prosecution’s case and sent Demich back into her abusive relationship with Dowd. 
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The practical effect of the holdings in Dowd and Pargeon is the complete 
dismantling of the prosecution’s case.  In Pargeon the defense was given a free pass 
to attack the credibility of the victim by implying that she would have left the 
relationship if she had actually been abused.  In Dowd, where the victim recanted, 
the situation was much more bleak.  The prosecution was left with a few photographs 
of Demich’s injuries and perhaps some testimony of outside witnesses, but the 
absence of the victim’s testimony most certainly crippled the case.89
IV.  PROSECUTORIAL USE OF THE SYNDROME OUTSIDE OF OHIO 
Several jurisdictions outside of Ohio have addressed the admissibility of expert 
testimony on the battered woman syndrome.  An overwhelming majority of these 
jurisdictions, even while operating under rules of evidence that mirror Ohio’s, have 
allowed prosecutors to introduce at least some form of expert testimony on the 
battered woman syndrome.90     
With its Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Ciskie, Washington became the 
first state to allow prosecutorial use of the battered woman syndrome.91  The 
defendant in Ciskie was charged with four counts of rape over a 23-month period 
with a woman with whom he had an intimate relationship.92  At trial, counsel for 
                                                                
89There are several other instances outside of self-defense and domestic violence cases 
where attempts have been made to introduce expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome in Ohio courts.  In State v. Lundgren, No. 90-L-15-125, 1994 WL 171657 (Ohio 
App. 11 Dist. 1994), Alice Lundgren sought the reversal of her conviction on several counts 
resulting from the kidnapping and murder of five family members at her residence in Kirtland, 
Ohio.  Id. at *1.  Lundgren challenged several evidentiary rulings by the trial judge including 
one involving expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.  Id.  At trial, Lundgren 
sought to admit testimony on the battered woman syndrome to show that she was in a state of 
duress at the time of the murder because she was under the control of her abusive husband.  Id. 
at *18.  The trial court refused to allow the testimony and the Eleventh District Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision citing Koss and O.R.C. § 2901.06 as limiting the use of 
testimony on the battered woman syndrome to self-defense cases.  Id.   
State v. Sonko, No. 95CA006181, 1996 WL 267749 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1996), involved 
Melissa Sonko’s appeal of her conviction for aggravated trafficking in drugs.  Id. at *1.  Sonko 
was convicted along with her boyfriend Robert Mantelero for attempting to sell lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD).  Id.  At trial, Sonko attempted to present expert testimony on the battered 
woman syndrome to explain why she had agreed to participate in the selling of the LSD.  Id. at 
*3.  Again, the trial court excluded the evidence and the Ninth District Court of Appeals 
affirmed this decision citing Koss, O.R.C.§ 2901.06, Pargeon, and Dowd.  Id.   
90See note 11, supra; see also Rogers, supra note 6, at 69.  
91751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988); see also Rogers, supra note 6, at 78. 
92Ciskie, 751 P.2d at 1166-67.  The facts in Ciskie offer an all too vivid description how a 
woman can become entrapped in the vicious cycle of domestic violence.  The record states 
that the victim was a 55-year-old who met Ciskie in a bar.  Id .at 1167.  He was the first man 
she was involved with since her divorce.  Id.  Just less than a year after they met, and three 
months after Ciskie lost his job, the relationship began to deteriorate.  Id.  She testified that she 
tried to “cool” the relationship, but Ciskie kept demanding to see her and called her 
repeatedly.  Id.  She also testified that Ciskie had a drinking problem at this time.  Their first 
sexual incident occurred approximately two months later when they had a “physical fight” 
because the victim would not go to bed with Ciskie.  Id.  The victim testified that Ciskie called 
several times the next day to apologize.  Id.  She testified that she continued contact with 
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defense claimed that the sexual acts were consensual, as evidenced by the victim’s 
failure to report the incidents immediately or to leave the relationship.93  In fact, the 
defense team had Ciskie, over the vigorous objections of the prosecutor, personally 
question the alleged victim during the defense case.94  He asked the alleged victim, 
“If I did as you – as you have said I’d done, why didn’t you call the police?”95   
In an attempt to explain the victim’s refusal to leave Ciskie, the prosecution 
introduced an expert to testify as to the symptoms a hypothetical victim suffering 
from the battered woman syndrome would exhibit.96  She testified that “the failure of 
the woman in the hypothetical to report the sexual assaults until two days after the 
last incident and nine months after the first, was characteristic of a person suffering 
from the battered woman syndrome.”97  The trial court admitted the expert testimony 
and Ciskie was convicted of several counts of rape.98
The Supreme Court of Washington found battered woman evidence useful to 
help the trier of fact, and thus properly admitted under Washington Evidence Rule 
702.99  The court relied heavily on its decision four years earlier in State v. Allery,100 
which allowed expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome to support a 
woman’s claim of self-defense.101  The court in Allery stated the following with 
regard to expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome: 
Where the psychologist is qualified to testify about the battered woman 
syndrome, and the defendant establishes her identity as a battered woman, 
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is admissible.  This 
evidence may have a substantial bearing on the woman’s perceptions and 
                                                          
Ciskie because she “felt sorry for him.”  Id.  This pattern of repeated sexual violence followed 
by contrition for several months, including the four alleged incidents of rape for which Ciskie 
was charged.  Id.  The record continues by describing with great detail the terror that the 
victim in Ciskie was subjected to over the next several months.  Id. 
93Id. at 1168-69. 
94Id. at 1173. 
95Id.  Furthermore, the defense challenged the victim’s credibility by explaining to the jury 
that her failure to leave the relationship and to not call the authorities was “inconsistent with 
that of a rape victim.”  Id.   
96Id. at 1166, 1173.  The State, at defense counsel’s request, asked the expert to express 
her opinion about a hypothetical case history that paralleled the evidence presented by the 
State in Ciskie.  Id. at 1173.  The expert said that “woman in the hypothetical case history 
suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder,” and the facts “were consistent with the cycle 
theory of violence.”  Id. 
97Id. 
98Id. at 1166, 1169. 
99Id. at 1166, 1171.  Washington Evidence Rule 702 states the following:  “If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to dtermine a fact in inssue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”  
WASH. R. EVID. 702.
100682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984). 
101Id. at 316. 
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behavior at the time of the killing and is central to her claim of self-
defense.102
Over the objection of the dissent, the majority in Ciskie refused to read the 
language in Allery as limiting the admissibility of expert testimony to self-defense 
cases.103 According to the majority, Allery required only that the testimony be 
“helpful to the jury’s understanding of the victim’s perceptions and behavior.”104  
The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court had “fully complied” with 
this guideline in admitting the expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome 
introduced by the prosecution.105
The court was concerned that the testimony might present a danger of unfair 
prejudice under Washington Evidence Rule 403.106  The court held, however, that the 
trial court properly limited the expert’s testimony by not allowing her specifically to 
diagnose the alleged victim as a rape victim.107  The expert may testify only to 
hypothetical situations and must avoid offering any specific opinion on the case at 
bar. 
The decision in Ciskie opened the door for what now appears to be a modern 
trend towards allowing prosecutorial introduction of battered woman evidence.108  
                                                                
102Id. 
103Justice Dore’s dissent argued that, “[n]othing in Allery suggests use of the battered 
woman testimony as affirmative evidence to prove elements of the crime charged.”  Ciskie, 
751 P.2d at 1176.  The difference between a self-defense claim and a prosecution for domestic 
violence, Justice Dore states, is that the woman’s state of mind is at issue in a self-defense 
case.  Id. Testimony on the battered woman syndrome helps the jury understand the 
defendant’s state of mind at the time she murdered her abuser.  Id.  “Battered woman 
testimony plays no such role in a rape prosecution.”  Id. Justice Dore also contended that the 
lack of understanding of battering relationships that an average member of the jury may have, 
“is not a sufficient ground to admit expert testimony that other wise has only limited probative 
value but substantial prejudicial impact on the defendant.  Id. at 1177. 
104Id. at 1172. 
105Id. at 1174. 
106Id. at 1173.  Washington Evidence Rule 403 states the following:  “Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the isues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  WASH. R. EVID. 403. 
107Ciskie, 751 P.2d at 1173-74.  The trial court permitted the expert to testify that she had 
diagnosed the alleged victim as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.  Id. at 1173.  She 
qualified this statement by acknowledging that the “stressors” that might cause the disorder 
“could be any unusual stressful event, not necessarily a rape or assault.”  Id.  The trial court 
would not allow the prosecutors to question the expert on what she believed the “stressor” to 
be in the alleged victim’s case.  Id. at 1173-74.  The Washington Supreme Court believed that, 
while this diagnosis “was not necessarily helpful to the trier of fact,” it was not overly 
prejudicial to the defendant.  Id. at 1174.  If the trial court would have allowed the expert to 
diagnose the alleged victim as a rape victim the testimony would have likely been 
inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403.  Id. 
108See Rogers, supra note 6, at 69.  Rogers notes that prior to 1991, only five jurisdictions 
had addressed the issue of prosecutorial use of expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome.  Id. at 68, 92.  She continues by stating that between 1991 and 1997 “appellate 
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The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, with its decision in State v. 
Frost,109 was one of the first courts to follow in the footsteps of the Washington 
Supreme Court. 
Frost involved the prosecution of Gregory Frost for violation of a restraining 
order and abuse of his girlfriend.110  At trial, the defense attacked the credibility of 
the victim on the theory that she was not in an abusive situation because, on the day 
of the alleged incident, the victim had consensual sex with Frost and spent the whole 
day talking with him.111  They argued that she fabricated the story to get back at 
Frost.112  The prosecution introduced expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome in an attempt to bolster the victim’s credibility.113  Again the expert 
testified to a lengthy hypothetical situation mirroring the actual case at bar.  She 
testified that the victim’s failure to call for help on the day of the incident “was 
consistent with the battered woman syndrome.”114
The court held that the expert’s testimony was admissible as evidence to bolster 
the victim’s credibility.115  As in Ciskie, the court in Frost was faced with precedent 
allowing expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in support of a victim of 
domestic violence’s claim of self-defense.116  The court rejected the view that 
                                                          
courts in at least thirteen more jurisdictions ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony to 
explain a battering victim’s puzzling behavior at or before trial.”  Id. at 69.  Of those thirteen 
jurisdictions, Ohio was the only one to fail to approve the prosecutorial use of expert 
testimony (Pargeon).  Id. 
109577 A.2d 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
110Id. at 1284.  Frost and his girlfriend had been romantically involved for over three years 
prior to this incident.  Id.  The couple had a violent relationship, and, in fact, the police had 
been called to the victim’s apartment approximately nine times due to domestic disputes.  Id. 
at 1285.  The victim had gotten a restraining order against Frost due to “fights and because 
they were no longer able to get along.”  Id.  On the date in question in this case, Frost had just 
gotten out of jail and returned to see the victim.  Id. at 1284.  Frost entered the victim’s house 
and began to yell at her and hit her.  Id.  The victim tried to leave, but when she could not get 
the front door open, Frost approached her and cut her arm with a box cutter.  Id.  She 
proceeded to talk with him and they ended up having sex to “calm him down.”  Id.  They spent 
the better part of the day together until the police were called to the house due to a domestic 
disturbance.  Id. at 1285.  
111Id. at 1288. 
112Id. 
113Id. at 1286.  The expert testified on eight behavioral characteristics from which battered 
women suffer from.  She stated that the victim was suffering from battered woman syndrome 
because she exhibited “a very high degree of seven out of eight of the characteristics: low self-
concept, belief in the family unit, a belief that her pregnancy would end the abuse, a history of 
abuse in her own family, self-blame, and a fear that defendant would come back no matter 
where she was.”  Id. at 1287. 
114Id. 
115Id. at 1288. 
116Id. at 1287; see Kelly, 478 A.2d 364.  In Kelly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
allowed expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome intended to explain the defendant’s 
state of mind and to bolster her claim of self-defense.  Id. at 375-76. 
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precedent from self-defense cases necessarily limited the use of such testimony to 
self-defense.117   Rather, the court explained, “there is nothing about the testimony 
itself which makes it inappropriate for admission as part of the State’s case in chief 
where the woman eventually asserts herself and reports her abuser to the authorities, 
before she becomes the defendant on trial for committing murder.”118
One federal court has also considered the issue and has permitted battered 
woman evidence.  The Eighth Circuit faced this issue in Arcoren v. United States.119  
The defendant in Arcoren was charged with the aggravated sexual abuse of his 
wife.120  The victim initially testified to the grand jury that her husband had sexually 
and physically assaulted her, but she recanted her testimony when called as a witness 
at trial.121  The District Court of South Dakota allowed the prosecution to introduce 
testimony on the battered woman syndrome to explain the victim’s recantation.122  
The expert testified as to the general characteristics associated with the battered 
woman syndrome based on her knowledge and experience with the subject.123   
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the jury was “faced with 
a bizarre situation” because of the victim’s recantation of her story.124  The court felt 
that the expert testimony would provide an explanation to the jury as to why the 
victim would act in such a manner.125  The court further held that there was “no 
persuasive reason” for limiting testimony on the battered woman syndrome to claims 
of self-defense.126  The court, however, limited the scope of the expert’s testimony, 
stating that the expert should not express any opinion on whether the particular 
victim suffers from symptoms of the battered woman syndrome.127
Also instructive is the case of State v. Cababag, from the Hawaii Intermediate 
Court of Appeals.128  Cababag involved the prosecution of Alfred Cababag for the 
                                                                
117Frost, 577 A.2d at 1287. 
118Id. 
119929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1991).  This case was in Federal court because it involved 
Indians and took place on an Indian Reservation. 
120Id. at 1237-38.  
121Id.  At trial the victim denied that defendant had abused her, and stated that the cuts and 
bruises on her faces were from an earlier motorbike wreck.  Id. at 1238.  She stated that, “she 
could not remember making the statements or that, where she did recall making them, they 
were incorrect.  Id. 
122Id. at 1238-39.  The prosecution initially used the victim’s grand jury testimony to 
impeach her later recantation at trial.  Id. at 1238.  To further support its case the government 
called an expert witness to testify regarding the battered woman syndrome.  Id.  
123Id. at 1239.  The District Court, while acknowledging that the testimony was admissible 
under Evidence Rule 702, warned that the expert could not “testify as to the ultimate fact that 
a particular party in this case . . . actually suffers from battered woman syndrome.”  Id. 
124Id. at 1240. 
125Id. 
126Id. at 1241. 
127Id. 
128850 P.2d 716 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993).  
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abuse of his girlfriend Susan Cuthbertson.129  At trial, Cuthbertson stated that she 
“made up” her previous statements to police implicating Cababag as her batterer.130  
Over the objection of defense counsel, the prosecution called a witness to testify as 
an expert on domestic violence.131  The trial court allowed the testimony and 
Cababag was convicted of abuse of family and household members.132
After acknowledging that the testimony met the requirements of Hawaii 
Evidence Rule 702, the Court of Appeals turned its focus to the limitations of Hawaii 
Evidence Rule 403.133  Hawaii Evidence Rule 403 operates in effectively the same 
manner as Ohio Evidence Rule 403.  Hawaii Evidence Rule 403 excludes relevant 
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.”134  The trial court placed several limitations on the expert’s testimony to 
avoid unfairly prejudicing the defendant: 
[The expert] will not be permitted to express any opinion about whether 
abuse occurred in the instant case, or whether the alleged victim’s report 
of abuse, either to the police initially, or in her testimony at trial, is 
truthful or untruthful . . . . The court will not allow (the expert) to state 
what percentage of alleged victims are female versus what percentage are 
male . . . . The court will not allow (the expert) to offer any testimony of 
predicting future violence by Cababag . . . .135
Counsel for the defense argued that, despite the limitations set by the trial court, the 
probative value of the testimony was still outweighed by its prejudicial effect.136  The 
Court of Appeals, however, denied this argument and affirmed the decision of the 
trial court.137
The preceding cases are only a sampling of the several jurisdictions that have 
allowed some form of testimony on the battered woman syndrome in domestic 
violence prosecutions.  Many, if not all, of these jurisdictions that have allowed 
prosecutorial use of the battered woman syndrome have set forth limitations similar 
                                                                
129Id. at 718. 
130Id. at 719. 
131Id.  The expert testified on the general characteristics of a victim of domestic violence, 
including recantation.  Id. at 719-20. 
132Id. at 717. 
133Id. at 720-22.  The relevant portion of Hawaii Evidence Rule 702 is as follows: “If 
scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.”  HAW. R. EVID. 702.     
134HAW. R. EVID. 403.  
135Cababag, 850 P.2d at 719. 
136Id. at 720. 
137Id. at 722-23.  In support of its holding, the court actually acknowledged the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s decision in Koss.  Id. at 721.  The court also stated that its holding in this 
case was “in accord with Arcoren v. United States.”  Id. at 722. 
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to those in Ciskie, Frost, and Arcoren.138  The decisions in these cases provide 
several guiding principles that can be applied to prosecutorial attempts to use expert 
testimony on the battered woman syndrome in Ohio.  The next part of this note will 
attempt to incorporate these principles into a potential framework for the 
prosecutorial introduction of testimony on the syndrome in Ohio. 
V.  DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROPER USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON 
THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has yet to address this issue.  The court, however, 
will surely feel increased pressure to address this issue in the coming years as a result 
of the emerging trend supporting admissibility,139 and the continued prevalence of 
battering relationships.140  This Part first discusses the applicable rules of evidence in 
Ohio, with which any potential framework for admissibility must comply.  Second, it 
attempts to refute the arguments presented in Pargeon and Dowd against 
admissibility.  Finally, it proposes a framework for the prosecutorial use of expert 
testimony that will provide the best opportunity for having the precedent set in 
Pargeon and Dowd overturned. 
A.  The Ohio Rules of Evidence  
Ohio Evidence Rule 702 specifically governs the admissibility of testimony by 
experts.141  Under Rule 702, a witness may testify as an expert if all of the following 
apply: 
(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the 
knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a 
misconception common among lay persons; 
                                                                
138See, e.g., State v. Stringer, 897 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1995).  For example, the defendant in 
Stringer was charged with assault and aggravated kidnapping.  Id. at 1065.  The state 
introduced testimony on the battered woman syndrome to explain why the victim had recanted 
her story that her ex-husband had committed the acts.  Id. at 1067.  While the Supreme Court 
of Montana held that the evidence in the case at bar was improperly admitted because the 
prosecution failed to show that the alleged victim was actually a victim of domestic violence, 
the court held that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome should generally be 
admissible in domestic violence prosecutions.  Id. at 1069.  The court cautioned, however, that 
the expert should not testify as to whether the alleged victim’s statements were credible or as 
to whether, in her opinion, the alleged victim was an actual victim of domestic violence.  Id.   
In State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993), the defense objected to the prosecution’s 
introduction of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome on the grounds that it was 
actually opinion testimony as to the credibility of a witness and therefore should have been 
excluded because it improperly invaded the province of the jury.  Id. at 1115.  The court held 
that the testimony was properly admitted, however, because the expert did not testify that the 
victim was, in fact, battered nor presented any opinion testimony as to the credibility of any 
other witness.  Id.; see also Rogers, supra note 6, at 79-80. 
139See Part IV, supra.  
140See Part II.A, supra. 
141OHIO R. EVID. 702. 
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(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject 
matter of the testimony; 
(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, 
or other specialized information . . . .142
Two additional Rules apply to battered woman evidence.  First, Evidence Rule 
403 provides an exception to the rule that all relevant evidence is admissible.  Ohio 
Evidence Rule 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence is not admissible if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of 
confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.”143  
Second, Ohio Evidence Rule 404 limits the use of evidence on the character of 
the accused and the victim.144  Generally, under Rule 404, “[e]vidence of a person’s 
character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purposes of proving that 
he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”145  There are, however, 
exceptions to this general rule: 
(1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same is admissible…. 
(2) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the 
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same…is admissible….146
Additionally, Rule 404 prohibits evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
introduced to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith.147
B.  Removing the Barriers Set Forth in Pargeon and Dowd 
1.  Ohio Evidence Rule 702 
Initially, Ohio Evidence Rule 702 was cited as the primary reason for excluding 
any expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.148  As stated previously, the 
Ohio Supreme Court believed that the battered woman syndrome did not meet the 
                                                                
142Id. 
143OHIO R. EVID. 403(A).  The trial court must exclude all evidence that falls under 
subsection (A).  Id.  Subsection (B) provides a discretionary restriction on relevant evidence.  
OHIO R. EVID. 403(B).  Subsection (B) states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”  Id.   
144OHIO R. EVID. 404. 
145OHIO R. EVID. 404(A). 
146OHIO R. EVID. 404(A)(1)-(2) (emphases added). 
147OHIO R. EVID. 404(B).   
148Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137; see Part V.A., supra, for the text of Ohio Evidence Rule 702. 
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requirements of Rule 702 because its subject matter was within the understanding of 
the jury and not sufficiently developed as a matter of commonly accepted scientific 
knowledge.149  Rule 702, however, no longer provides a barrier to the admission of 
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome. 
As previously discussed, the Ohio Supreme Court in Koss, officially recognized 
that testimony on the battered woman syndrome dispelled common misconceptions 
about abused women common among lay persons.150  Additionally, the court held 
that the subject matter of the syndrome had gained substantial scientific acceptance 
to warrant admissibility.151  Thus, the court has clearly acknowledged that testimony 
on the battered woman syndrome satisfies the Rule 702 threshold requirements for 
expert testimony.   
Furthermore, the Ohio General Assembly, with the enactment of O.R.C. 
§ 2901.06, formally accepted the battered woman syndrome as satisfying the Rule 
702 requirements for expert testimony.152  Section 2901.06 reiterated that the battered 
woman syndrome is a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge and that 
the subject matter and details of the syndrome are not within the general 
understanding of an average lay person.153  Therefore, in light of the enactment of 
§ 2901.06 and the decision in Koss, Ohio Evidence Rule 702 no longer provides an 
obstruction to the prosecutorial introduction of expert testimony on the battered 
woman syndrome.154  This contention is further supported by the fact that Rule 702 
was not cited as a reason to bar testimony on the battered woman syndrome in both 
Pargeon and Dowd.   
2.  Evidence Rule 403 
While the courts in Pargeon and Dowd did not cite to Evidence Rule 702, they 
did hold that Evidence Rule 403 prohibited the prosecutorial introduction of 
testimony on the battered woman syndrome.155  Both courts maintained that the 
probative value of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant in a domestic violence 
                                                                
149Id. at 140; Ssee Part III.A., supra, for a discussion on the court’s decision in Thomas. 
150Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973-74; see Part III.A., supra, for discussion on the court’s 
decision in Koss.   
151Id. at 974. 
152 See Part III.A., supra, for a full discussion on the language of § 2901.06. 
153OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2901.06(A)(1)-(2) (West 2003).   
154Although Koss was a murder case where the defendant introduced testimony on the 
battered woman syndrome in support of her claim of self-defense, it necessarily follows that 
the court’s analysis on the syndrome in and of itself would apply to prosecutorial use of the 
syndrome.  See Part III.A., supra, for a discussion of Justice Resnick’s opinion in Koss.  
Justice Resnick recognized the merits of the syndrome as a matter outside of the jury’s 
knowledge and acknowledges the scientific merits of the syndrome.  The subject matter of the 
battered woman syndrome approved by Justice Resnick in Koss and by the Ohio General 
Assembly in § 2901.06 is the same subject matter that would be used by prosecutors in 
domestic violence cases.  
155Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 666; Dowd, 1994 WL 18645 at *1; see Part III.B., supra, for a 
discussion on the decisions in Pargeon and Dowd. 
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prosecution.156  Neither court, however, provided any rationale to support this 
contention.157
As mentioned earlier, prosecutors encounter difficulties in domestic violence 
prosecutions that they would not otherwise encounter in most non-domestic-violence 
related criminal prosecutions.  Victims of domestic violence often refuse to testify or 
recant prior stories implicating their significant other, or they may be attacked on the 
witness stand for failing to leave their alleged batter or report battering incidents to 
the police.158  Therefore, as all other jurisdictions to consider the issue have 
acknowledged, the probative value of expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome to prosecutors in such cases is extremely high.  The testimony allows the 
prosecution an opportunity to explain to the jury this seemingly abnormal behavior 
by the alleged victim.159  
Moreover, Justice Resnick recognized the probative value of testimony on the 
battered woman syndrome with her dicta in the Koss decision.160  She noted that 
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would “help dispel the ordinary 
lay person’s perception that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at 
any time,” and “counter any ‘common sense’ conclusions by the jury that if the 
beatings were really that bad the woman would have left her husband much 
earlier.”161  That Justice Resnick’s statements were made in the context of a self-
defense case is irrelevant because she was describing the probative value of 
testimony on the battered woman syndrome in and of itself and not specifically in 
self-defense cases.  This is evidenced by her statement that “[e]xpert testimony 
regarding the battered woman syndrome can be admitted to help the jury not only to 
understand the battered woman syndrome but also to determine whether the 
defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent 
danger when considering the issue of self-defense.”162
It is only in light of such high probative value that the prejudicial impact of 
prosecutorial introduction of testimony on the battered woman syndrome should be 
analyzed.  While some commentators urge caution in approaching this Rule 403 
balance,163 it has been observed that “[t]estimony concerning Battered Woman 
                                                                
156Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 666; see also Dowd, 1994 WL 18645 at *1. 
157The court in Pargeon simply stated that “[t]he probative value of such testimony is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and therefore its exclusion is 
mandatory.”  582 N.E.2d at 666.  The court in Dowd simply cited to the holding in Pargeon on 
this issue and stated that they would not deviate from it.  1994 WL 18645 at *1.  
158Rogers, supra note 6, at 68. 
159See Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1240; see also Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 at 1173. 
160See Part III.A., supra. 
161Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973. 
162Id. (emphasis added). 
163See Faigman & Wright, supra note 8, at 98-99.  Faigman and Wright state that “[t]he 
Rule 403 balance does not obviously favor admission of the syndrome to bolster the credibility 
of a prosecution witness,” because of its low probative value.  Id. at 98.  They also contend 
that the battered woman syndrome was not designed with this use in mind and that battered 
women are not more likely to recant previous statements at trial than anyone else.  Id.   
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Syndrome is not unduly prejudicial to the defendant because virtually all the 
evidence presented concerns behavioral characteristics of the battered woman, not 
the abuser.”164  However, even acknowledging that some potential for prejudice does 
exist, it does not justify outright exclusion.  Rule 403 is a balancing test between 
probative value and potential prejudicial impact.  As several courts have declared, 
the potential danger of prejudice in domestic violence cases can be significantly 
diminished by properly limiting the scope of the testimony.165  Where the expert 
limits testimony to the general characteristics of the battered woman syndrome and 
hypothetical situations, the probative value of such testimony is not outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.   
Prosecutors in Ohio should adhere to these limitations when presenting expert 
testimony on the battered woman syndrome in domestic violence cases.  This will 
put them in the best position when a court is called upon again to make a Rule 403 
balancing judgment on the testimony.  The prosecutor in Pargeon clearly failed to 
adhere to these limitations when introducing testimony on the syndrome and as a 
result the court refused to admit it.  The prosecutor offered the testimony to “prove 
that [Pargeon’s] wife was a battered woman suffering from the battered woman 
syndrome.”166  This testimony would not have been admitted under the standards set 
forth in Ciskie and Arcoren because it was being used to identify the specific witness 
as suffering from battered woman syndrome.  Prosecutors in Ohio must focus on 
limiting any potential testimony to the characteristics of the battered woman 
syndrome in general and responses to hypothetical questions. 
3.  Ohio Evidence Rule 404 
In addition to Evidence Rule 403, the courts in both Pargeon and Dowd cited 
Evidence Rule 404 as a second reason to bar battered woman syndrome testimony.167  
The court in Pargeon held that “evidence that appellant’s wife is a battered woman 
really serves as evidence of the prior bad acts of the appellant from which the 
inference may be drawn that appellant has the propensity to beat his wife and that he 
beat her on this particular occasion,” which is prohibited under Evidence Rule 
404(B).168  Again, the problem is that the prosecutor in Pargeon attempted to 
introduce testimony that specifically identified the alleged victim as suffering from 
the battered woman syndrome.  Thus, Pargeon can easily be distinguished from the 
numerous cases outside of Ohio that have held that testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome in domestic violence productions does not violate Evidence Rule 404. 
By avoiding testimony identifying the alleged victim as suffering from the 
battered woman syndrome, a prosecutor will avoid Rule 404 prohibition.  The expert 
witness in Arcoren expressed no opinion on whether the alleged victim suffered from 
                                                                
164See Patton, supra note 15, at 13. 
165See Ciskie, 751 P.2d at 1173-74; Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1241; Cababag, 850 P.2d at 719; 
Borrelli, 629 A.2d at 1115; see also People v. Morgan, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1210 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997). 
166Pargeon, 582 N.E. at 666. 
167Id.; see also Dowd, 1994 WL 18645 at *1. 
168Pargeon, 582 N.E. at 666. 
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the syndrome or on which of her conflicting statements was more credible.169  The 
court held that the expert did not “interfere or impinge upon the jury’s role in 
determining the credibility of witnesses.”170  Her testimony simply aided the jury in 
evaluating the evidence that was presented by the prosecution.171  Therefore, by 
limiting the expert’s testimony to describing the characteristics of the battered 
woman syndrome generally and answering only hypothetical questions, the 
prosecution will avoid violating Evidence Rule 404. 
The decision in Dowd is somewhat more troubling because the expert there was 
to testify concerning the characteristics of a battering relationship and that it was not 
uncommon for those who suffer from the battered woman syndrome to recant 
previous statements that they were abused.172  However, the Dowd court’s Rule 404 
“analysis,” such as it was, seems plainly mistaken.  The court failed to recognize this 
distinguishing fact and simply adhered to the holding in Pargeon, rejecting the 
testimony.  The court did not provide any analysis on why it felt this limited form of 
testimony violated Rule 404.  Therefore, Dowd really should be given no weight 
when discussing the merits of such limited testimony under Rule 404. 
4.  State v. Koss 
Evidence Rules 403 and 404 were not the only bars to prosecutorial introduction 
of the battered woman syndrome cited in Pargeon and Dowd.  A “more compelling 
reason” for the exclusion of such testimony, according to the court in Pargeon, was 
that the Ohio Supreme Court in Koss had limited the use of testimony on the battered 
woman syndrome to cases where a defendant uses it in support of her claim of self-
defense.173  Such a narrow reading of the decision in Koss, however, is not required. 
An examination of Justice Resnick’s language in the majority opinion in Koss 
fails to reveal any language indicating that the court intended to limit the use of 
testimony on the syndrome to self-defense cases.  Absent from Justice Resnick’s 
opinion is any statement that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome may 
only be introduced in cases where the defendant asserts the affirmative defense of 
self-defense.  The holding in Koss states only the following: “Where the evidence 
establishes that a woman is a battered woman, and when an expert is qualified to 
testify about the battered woman syndrome, expert testimony concerning the 
syndrome may be admitted to assist the trier of fact in determining whether the 
defendant acted in self-defense.”174  This holding simply asserts that self-defense 
cases are one of the permissible categories of cases in which expert testimony on the 
battered woman syndrome may be admitted.  Had Justice Resnick intended to limit 
the testimony to such cases, she could have easily done so by stating that testimony 
“may be admitted . . . only in self-defense cases.”  The majority opinion in Koss, thus 
is neither a restriction on, nor an endorsement of the use of expert testimony on the 
syndrome in domestic violence cases. 
                                                                
169Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1241. 
170Id. 
171Id. 
172Dowd, 1994 WL 18645 at *1. 
173Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 666. 
174Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 975 (emphasis added). 
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One court that has addressed Koss has come to a similar conclusion regarding the 
ambiguity of its language.175  In State v. Daws, the Second District Court of Appeals 
heard Susan Daws’ appeal from her conviction for voluntary manslaughter.176  The 
primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by precluding Daws’ expert 
from testifying regarding whether Daws reasonably believed that she was in 
imminent danger and needed to use deadly force on the night of the shooting.177  The 
court encountered difficulty when it attempted to interpret Justice Resnick’s 
statement that expert testimony on the syndrome could be admitted to “help the jury 
not only understand the battered woman syndrome,” but also to “determine whether 
defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent 
danger when considering the issue of self-defense.”178  The court offered the 
following interpretation: 
Nowhere in its opinion did the court define or explain what it meant by 
“expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome” or in what 
context such testimony could be used.  Only the purpose for the admission 
of such testimony is clear.  That is, expert testimony on the battered 
woman syndrome is to be admitted for both its original purpose of 
dispelling the misconceptions of jurors concerning battered women and its 
broader purpose of informing the jurors’ determination of whether the 
accused’s beliefs and use of force were reasonable.179
The court concluded that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Koss did “not establish the 
limits, if any, on expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.”180  
While not finding any limitations set forth in Koss, Daws did define two 
permissible purposes for use of the syndrome based on Koss: 1) dispelling the 
misconceptions of jurors concerning battered women; and 2) informing the jurors’ 
determination of whether the accused’s beliefs and use of force were reasonable.181  
Prosecutorial use of the syndrome clearly falls under the first permissible purpose.  
This interpretation of the language in Koss is inconsistent with that of Pargeon and 
Dowd, but is in line with the interpretation advocated in this note. 
The contention that Koss is not a limitation is further supported by the case law 
from outside Ohio that has addressed this exact issue.  As previously discussed, the 
defense counsel in Ciskie argued that Allery, a previous Washington Supreme Court 
decision allowing testimony on the battered woman syndrome in a self-defense case, 
limited the use of testimony on the syndrome to such cases.182  Over Justice Dore’s 
                                                                
175Daws, 662 N.E.2d 805. 
176Id. at 810. 
177Id. 
178Id. at 812. 
179Id. 
180Id. 
181Id. 
182See Part IV, supra, for a full discussion on how the court in Ciskie addressed the 
precedent set by Allery. 
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dissent,183 the court failed to find such a limitation set forth in Allery.  This decision 
is highly instructive for purposes of this note because of the similarities between 
Allery and Koss.  
While the decision in Ciskie was highly instructive, the Frost case may even be 
more enlightening.  In Frost, counsel for the defendant argued that New Jersey 
precedent had limited the use of testimony on the syndrome to self-defense cases.184  
Once again the court disagreed, asserting that there was no reason to believe that the 
testimony would be any more inappropriate if used by the prosecution as opposed to 
the defense in a murder case.185  The court offered the following common sense 
rationale to support this contention: 
It would seem anomalous to allow a battered woman, where she is a 
criminal defendant, to offer this type of expert testimony in order to help 
the jury understand the actions she took, yet deny her the same 
opportunity when she is the complaining witness and/or victim and her 
abuser is the criminal defendant.186
This little bit of common sense, if adopted by Ohio courts, could go a long way in 
alleviating the prevalent domestic violence problem in Ohio. 
5.  Ohio Revised Code § 2901.06 
The second principal argument in Pargeon is that the Ohio General Assembly, 
with the enactment of O.R.C. § 2901.06, limited the use of the syndrome to self-
defense cases.187  The court cited the plain text of the statute as its only rationale 
supporting their contention.188  This contention is clearly fallible, however, as no 
clear evidence of the General Assembly’s intent is present in the plain text of the 
statute or the legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 2901.06. 
As previously stated, the plain text of § 2901.06 offers persons who have been 
charged with an offense involving force the opportunity to introduce testimony on 
the syndrome in support of a claim of self-defense.189  There is no language present 
in the statute, though, that specifically limits the use of such testimony to self-
defense cases.  The Pargeon court failed to recognize this important distinction. 
This distinction is further evidenced by examining the legislative history 
surrounding the enactment of § 2901.06.  Evidence of the legislature’s intent in 
introducing House Bill 484, later codified as § 2901.06, can be seen in the following 
excerpt from a Legislative Services Commission report on the bill: 
                                                                
183See note 106, supra, for a discussion on Justice Dore’s dissenting opinion in Ciskie. 
184Frost, 577 A.2d at 1287; see Part IV, supra, for a full discussion on how the court in 
Frost addressed the precedent set by Kelly. 
185Frost, 577 A.2d at 1287. 
186Id. 
187Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 667. 
188Id. 
189OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (B) (West 2003); see Part III.A., supra, for the full 
text of § 2901.06. 
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Declares that the General Assembly recognizes that the “battered woman 
syndrome” currently is a matter of commonly accepted scientific 
knowledge and that the subject matter and details of the syndrome are not 
within general understanding or experience of the general public or within 
the field of common knowledge. 
Permits a person who is charged with an offense involving the use of 
force against another and who argues self-defense to introduce expert 
testimony of the "battered woman syndrome" and that the person suffered 
from the syndrome.190
Furthermore, the legislative declarations section of the Legislative Services 
Commission report reiterates that H.B. 484 was intended to “permit” the use of 
testimony on the syndrome in self-defense cases.191  Nothing contained in the 
legislative history specifically indicates that the General Assembly intended H.B. 
484 to act as a limitation on the use of the syndrome.  There is no evidence that 
prosecutorial use of the syndrome was even contemplated by the legislature, either 
negatively or positively.  The only thing that can be absolutely ascertained is that the 
legislature wanted to end Ohio’s past practice of disallowing all evidence on the 
battered woman syndrome.   
Further support for this contention can be found in the timing of the introduction 
of H.B. 484.  As previously stated, the bill was introduced on May 2, 1989, 
approximately six months before Koss came before the Ohio Supreme Court.192  
While the bill was officially signed into law after the Koss decision, the fact that it 
was introduced before that decision indicates an intention on the part of the 
legislature to “open the door” for testimony on the syndrome as opposed to an 
intention to “close the door,” limiting its use to supporting self-defense claims.  Had 
the bill been introduced in the wake of the Koss decision, a much stronger argument 
could be made that the legislature was trying to limit use of the syndrome to self-
defense cases such as Koss.     
C.  A Proposed Framework for Admission 
As outlined above, the prosecutorial introduction of testimony on the battered 
woman syndrome must be in accordance with the applicable Ohio Rules of 
Evidence.  The best way to approach this is by utilizing the limited format advocated 
by the courts in Ciskie and Arcoren.  Under this approach, experts who are called to 
testify in domestic violence prosecutions must limit their testimony to the general 
characteristics of a victim suffering from the battered woman syndrome.  The expert 
may also answer hypothetical questions regarding specific abnormal behaviors 
exhibited by women suffering from the syndrome, but should never offer an opinion 
relative to the alleged victim in the case.   
The second limitation on the prosecutorial use of the syndrome involves when it 
may be used.  Prosecutors must limit their use of the syndrome to cases in which the 
                                                                
190H.R. 118-HB484, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Ohio 1990), available at 
http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/oh_ban_118:HB484.lsc.   
191Id. at *2. 
192Id. 
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victim exhibits abnormal behavior that may appear baffling to the jury.  Specifically, 
testimony should be offered when a victim is questioned for remaining in a battering 
relationship or refusing to seek immediate police intervention, or when the victim 
recants a previous statement implicating her significant other as an abuser.  
Testimony on the syndrome should not be used in the absence of such circumstances 
because of the danger of prejudice of the defendant. Introducing testimony on the 
battered woman syndrome in this manner should give prosecutors their best chance 
at approval by the courts. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
While conducting research for this note, the author spent quite a bit of time 
viewing a wide variety of websites dealing with domestic violence issues.  While he 
was troubled by the horrific stories of abuse and the alarming statistics presented one 
particular item truly caught his attention.  On the National Domestic Violence 
Hotline’s website appears the following warning: “Safety alert: Computer use can be 
monitored and is impossible to completely clear. If you are afraid your internet 
and/or computer usage might be monitored, please use a safer computer, call your 
local hotline, and/or call the National Domestic Violence Hotline.”193  This was not a 
generic warning to all computer users that an employer or the government may be 
monitoring their Internet usage.  This was a specific warning to victims of domestic 
violence that their batterer may be monitoring their behavior on the Internet.  The 
author can only begin to imagine the feelings of fear and entrapment that a battered 
woman must feel when they view this warning.    
This type of warning clearly illustrates the problems that prosecutors face in 
domestic violence prosecutions.  An average person does not easily understand the 
amount of control that a batterer can exert over his victim.  A batterer will employ 
emotional and financial coercion, destruction of property, and physical battering to 
“maintain the male’s domination of his mate.”194  Acts of contrition by the batterer 
further confuse the matter.  The victim is led to believe that the violence is over and 
that she is safe in the relationship.195  The problem is that this period of time is when 
outside persons most often come into contact with the victim.196  Thus, the outside 
person sees the victim in a state of apparent happiness, which makes it more difficult 
to understand her actual situation.   
The current state of law in Ohio provides an uphill battle for any victim that 
gathers up the tremendous amount of courage necessary to leave her batterer and 
report the incidents to the police.  Defense attorneys have a license to assault the 
victim’s credibility, questioning why she stayed in the relationship if it was so bad 
and why she failed to seek police intervention at an earlier time.  A jury is easily 
persuaded by these arguments because they just don’t understand the situation that 
these women are actually in.  The problem is often intensified when the victim is 
lured back into her battering relationship before trial and subsequently recants her 
                                                                
193National Domestic Violence Hotline, available at http://www.ndvh.org (last visited 
February 18, 2004). 
194Raeder, supra note 16, at 793. 
195See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 65-70 (1979). 
196See id. 
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previous story.  An average member of the jury would surly not understand this 
action taken by the victim.  They have no concept of the power that the batterer’s 
contrition has over the victim, or the fact that she will almost surely be victimized 
again shortly thereafter.197  
The prosecution must have an opportunity to present a case in such situations.  
Allowing prosecutors to introduce expert testimony on the battered woman 
syndrome in the limited scope proscribed in this note will educate the average juror 
on the plight of a battered woman, but not unduly prejudice the defendant.  The Ohio 
Supreme Court has yet to speak on this difficult issue.  The fates of an extraordinary 
number of women in Ohio will rest on their decision. 
MATTHEW P. HAWES 
                                                                
197See id. 
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